Tuesday, March 29, 2011
An Update
Although it has been a while since I have given an update on my History Engine episode progress, I have written and revised my episode. I believe that is of high quality right now but could be improved even more before Friday. Additionally, I re-examined Lamers' biography of Rosecrans, "The Edge of Glory." Interestingly, he places some of the blame on General Wood for the fateful order: "If Wood knew the position of affairs and that the movement was impossible, why did he not tell Rosecrans, instead of moving out of the line?" (344).
Monday, February 28, 2011
Wood's Report from Chickamauga
I found General Wood's official report from Chickamauga in the Furman library's official government documents collection on Monday, Feb. 28. The report can be located on pages 625-642 of Volume 30, Part I of the "War of the Rebellion" series.
Wood's report is crucial to my project because it contains the exact text of Rosecrans' order given to Wood. The report also contains Wood's reaction to the order.
Wood notes that when he received the order, "the enemy was in considerable force in my immediate front." Upon realizing that there was no gap near Reynolds' line, Wood asked General Thomas if he [Thomas] could amend the order to merely move slightly to the left, in order to assist General Baird. Thomas did so. Wood soon realized that "when I moved my command to go to the support of General Reynolds, the gap thus made in our lines was not closed by the troops on my right, and that the enemy poured through it very soon in great force."
Wood also notes in his report that, at one point, he ordered his soldiers to cease fire because he thought they were firing on fellow Union soldiers. This is because the dirty and greasy Confederate uniforms were beginning to closely resemble those of the Union. Once the friendlies began advancing and firing on Wood's troops, he realized his mistake. Clearly, confusion abounded at Chickamauga.
It is also significant that, at the end of the report, Wood does not laud Rosecrans for his valor, ability, etc, despite the fact that he praises dozens of other commanders. In my estimation, Wood did not want to follow through with Rosecrans' order, but felt that it was his duty to do so. This is evidenced by the fact that he got General Thomas to modify it. Clearly, Rosecrans' subordinates recognized the grave error of the order as soon as it was issued.
Wood's report is crucial to my project because it contains the exact text of Rosecrans' order given to Wood. The report also contains Wood's reaction to the order.
Wood notes that when he received the order, "the enemy was in considerable force in my immediate front." Upon realizing that there was no gap near Reynolds' line, Wood asked General Thomas if he [Thomas] could amend the order to merely move slightly to the left, in order to assist General Baird. Thomas did so. Wood soon realized that "when I moved my command to go to the support of General Reynolds, the gap thus made in our lines was not closed by the troops on my right, and that the enemy poured through it very soon in great force."
Wood also notes in his report that, at one point, he ordered his soldiers to cease fire because he thought they were firing on fellow Union soldiers. This is because the dirty and greasy Confederate uniforms were beginning to closely resemble those of the Union. Once the friendlies began advancing and firing on Wood's troops, he realized his mistake. Clearly, confusion abounded at Chickamauga.
It is also significant that, at the end of the report, Wood does not laud Rosecrans for his valor, ability, etc, despite the fact that he praises dozens of other commanders. In my estimation, Wood did not want to follow through with Rosecrans' order, but felt that it was his duty to do so. This is evidenced by the fact that he got General Thomas to modify it. Clearly, Rosecrans' subordinates recognized the grave error of the order as soon as it was issued.
Episode Outline
After reviewing the sources I have compiled so far, I think I have a good outline for my episode. I will begin by setting the stage for the Battle of Chickamauga. Then I will discuss how Rosecrans was informed of the chasm that existed in the line. Next, I will review the order and how it was a critical mistake on the part of Rosecrans. Finally, I will discuss how the order, as well as the subsequent Confederate defeat, impacted Rosecrans' career and legacy.
Further Clarification of Rosecrans' Order
On Monday afternoon (2/28) I located another book in the Furman library about Chickamauga, "Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West" by Glenn Tucker. Tucker discusses Rosecrans' order to Wood on pages 254-256.
Tucker says that Captain Kellog's (a member of Thomas' staff) report to Rosecrans indicated that "Brannan was out of line and Reynolds' right flank exposed." Tucker then explains that, upon hearing this, as well as another report that there was "a chasm in the center" of the line, Rosecrans panicked and had an aide, Frank S. Bond, write the fateful order.
According to Tucker, Rosecrans' order was merely "excitement at the moment." While the order itself was indeed fateful, the fact that Rosecrans chose Bond to write it, rather than James A. Garfield, at the time Rosecrans' chief of staff, was the chief error.
According to Tucker, Garfield had written a large majority of Rosecrans' orders during the battle but that Rosecrans did not feel the need to consult Garfield on this order, however, since he was engaged in another matter. Tucker attacks Rosecrans for failing to consult Garfield, who knew the exact positions of the units and would have known that a chasm in the line did not exist. "It happened to be the most consequential order issued during the battle, and it was the only order issued that he [Garfield] did not write."
Tucker attributes Rosecrans' failure to consult Garfield to the fact that the General was "feeling the strain of battle." His failure to consult Garfield "gives evidence of the approach of an instability dangerous for the leader of a great army in the presence of resourceful enemies...Rosecrans' [lapse] was due unquestionably to mental strain and physical exhaustion."
Tucker says that Captain Kellog's (a member of Thomas' staff) report to Rosecrans indicated that "Brannan was out of line and Reynolds' right flank exposed." Tucker then explains that, upon hearing this, as well as another report that there was "a chasm in the center" of the line, Rosecrans panicked and had an aide, Frank S. Bond, write the fateful order.
According to Tucker, Rosecrans' order was merely "excitement at the moment." While the order itself was indeed fateful, the fact that Rosecrans chose Bond to write it, rather than James A. Garfield, at the time Rosecrans' chief of staff, was the chief error.
According to Tucker, Garfield had written a large majority of Rosecrans' orders during the battle but that Rosecrans did not feel the need to consult Garfield on this order, however, since he was engaged in another matter. Tucker attacks Rosecrans for failing to consult Garfield, who knew the exact positions of the units and would have known that a chasm in the line did not exist. "It happened to be the most consequential order issued during the battle, and it was the only order issued that he [Garfield] did not write."
Tucker attributes Rosecrans' failure to consult Garfield to the fact that the General was "feeling the strain of battle." His failure to consult Garfield "gives evidence of the approach of an instability dangerous for the leader of a great army in the presence of resourceful enemies...Rosecrans' [lapse] was due unquestionably to mental strain and physical exhaustion."
Reexamining Rosecrans' Official Report
After determining that I am going to focus my episode on Rosecrans' order to General Wood to move his division to the left, creating a hole for Longstreet to exploit, I went back and looked at Rosecrans' official report to see what he said about that order.
About 2/3 of the way through his report (p. 58), Rosecrans notes that before the day's fighting began, he determined that closing off the left portion of the Union lines was of extreme importance. Later in the report, the General says that he received word from an aide of General Thomas informed him "that General Reynolds right was exposed." Therefore, "orders were dispatched to General Wood to close up on Reynolds."
In Rosecrans' view, Wood mistook the orders to "close up" as a command to withdraw from the line and walk behind the line to the left. He also says that the percieved gap in General Brannan's line was merely "en echelon, slightly in rear of Reynolds line." Rosecrans' then says that the order to General Wood and Wood's subsequent movement was an "unfortunate mistake" that allowed the Confederates to break through the Union lines and demolish the Union forces.
Rosecrans notes that "Davis' two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division were driven from the field."
It is evident, on a re-reading of Rosecrans' report, that he realized the gravity of his error and its consequences on the battle. He does place some blame on Wood for mistaking his order, though one must fault Rosecrans for giving it in the first place.
About 2/3 of the way through his report (p. 58), Rosecrans notes that before the day's fighting began, he determined that closing off the left portion of the Union lines was of extreme importance. Later in the report, the General says that he received word from an aide of General Thomas informed him "that General Reynolds right was exposed." Therefore, "orders were dispatched to General Wood to close up on Reynolds."
In Rosecrans' view, Wood mistook the orders to "close up" as a command to withdraw from the line and walk behind the line to the left. He also says that the percieved gap in General Brannan's line was merely "en echelon, slightly in rear of Reynolds line." Rosecrans' then says that the order to General Wood and Wood's subsequent movement was an "unfortunate mistake" that allowed the Confederates to break through the Union lines and demolish the Union forces.
Rosecrans notes that "Davis' two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division were driven from the field."
It is evident, on a re-reading of Rosecrans' report, that he realized the gravity of his error and its consequences on the battle. He does place some blame on Wood for mistaking his order, though one must fault Rosecrans for giving it in the first place.
Rosecrans' Fateful Order
On Sunday night (2/27) I searched the Furman library catalog for books on the Battle of Chickamauga and found one of note, "Chattanooga: A Death Grip on the Confederacy" by James Lee McDonough.
This book is important for my project because McDonough discusses Rosecrans at the Battle of Chickamauga. He calls Rosecrans' order to General Wood on September 20 at 10 a.m. to close up the non-existent gap in General Reynolds' line "the determining factor in one of the most desparately fought battles of the war." In response, CSA General Longstreet marched his division through the hole in the Union line created by Wood and decimated the Union forces.
After reviewing the book's discussion of Rosecrans at Chickamauga, I have decided to focus my episode on that fateful order and how it affected the battle and Rosecrans' later career.
This book is important for my project because McDonough discusses Rosecrans at the Battle of Chickamauga. He calls Rosecrans' order to General Wood on September 20 at 10 a.m. to close up the non-existent gap in General Reynolds' line "the determining factor in one of the most desparately fought battles of the war." In response, CSA General Longstreet marched his division through the hole in the Union line created by Wood and decimated the Union forces.
After reviewing the book's discussion of Rosecrans at Chickamauga, I have decided to focus my episode on that fateful order and how it affected the battle and Rosecrans' later career.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Rosecrans at Chickamauga: In His Own Words
While reviewing the bibliography of Rosecrans' "Edge of Glory" biography by William Lamers, I stumbled upon a fascinating article written by Rosecrans in the Century Illustrated magazine in 1887. The article, "The Campaign for Chattanooga," is a 5-page defense of the Chickamauga campaign 25 years later.
It is valuable because it shows that Rosecrans still thought deeply about Chickamauga, even 25 years later. He was concerned enough with his place in history to write a guest piece for Century Illustrated. (In the 1880's, Century ran a series of highly successful pieces on the Civil War).
He emphasizes the necessity of holding the left flank even more so than in his original report. Additionally, he reprints the exact orders he gave during the battle, attempting to explain his miscues.
I accessed this source on 2/27.
It is valuable because it shows that Rosecrans still thought deeply about Chickamauga, even 25 years later. He was concerned enough with his place in history to write a guest piece for Century Illustrated. (In the 1880's, Century ran a series of highly successful pieces on the Civil War).
He emphasizes the necessity of holding the left flank even more so than in his original report. Additionally, he reprints the exact orders he gave during the battle, attempting to explain his miscues.
I accessed this source on 2/27.
Rosecrans Biography
On Sunday afternoon (2/27), I ordered "The Edge of Glory: A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans" by William Lamers through the Pascal service. I was able to view the majority of the book on Google Books, however, and read the sections on Chickamauga and Rosecrans' military background.
This biography is valuable because the author examines multiple sources to develop a clearer picture of what happened at Chickamauga. He uses everything from official reports to Rosecrans' personal papers.
Lamers is extremely critical of Rosecrans' performance at Chickamauga. He attacks the General's decision to send Garfield to Thomas while he rode to Chattanooga. According to Lamers, Rosecrans should have stayed and fought. Interestingly, Lamers does not criticize Rosecrans for believing that a gap in the Union lines existed, as others have. He attacks him for being cowardly and fleeing the battlefield.
This biography is valuable because the author examines multiple sources to develop a clearer picture of what happened at Chickamauga. He uses everything from official reports to Rosecrans' personal papers.
Lamers is extremely critical of Rosecrans' performance at Chickamauga. He attacks the General's decision to send Garfield to Thomas while he rode to Chattanooga. According to Lamers, Rosecrans should have stayed and fought. Interestingly, Lamers does not criticize Rosecrans for believing that a gap in the Union lines existed, as others have. He attacks him for being cowardly and fleeing the battlefield.
Rosecrans' New York Times Obituary
I though it would be interesting to see what the NY Times said about Rosecrans after his death. Obituaries are always difficult to gauge historically because they are rarely negative or critical. However, they are important since they show how a figure was viewed immediately after his life.
I went to the New York Times archive website on 2/27 and searched for General Rosecrans' obituary. It was published on March 12, 1898, the day after Rosecrans' death. It can be accessed here.
The obituary is valuable for my research because of its section on Rosecrans' performance at Chickamauga. The author doesn't exactly hold back: "the right wing of the army, which he commanded, was beaten at Chickamauga...Reports adverse to his conduct poured into Washington." He does cite the positive opinion of Gen. Thomas about Rosecrans in the obituary, though.
I went to the New York Times archive website on 2/27 and searched for General Rosecrans' obituary. It was published on March 12, 1898, the day after Rosecrans' death. It can be accessed here.
The obituary is valuable for my research because of its section on Rosecrans' performance at Chickamauga. The author doesn't exactly hold back: "the right wing of the army, which he commanded, was beaten at Chickamauga...Reports adverse to his conduct poured into Washington." He does cite the positive opinion of Gen. Thomas about Rosecrans in the obituary, though.
Getting Started
I know, I know, I'm probably getting started too late. It's Sunday afternooon (2/27) and I'm just beginning to compile my research. But I have already found and read General Rosecrans' report from the Battle of Chickamauga (located in the War of the Rebellion official records; 1890; vol. 30; p. 47-64.). I found it in the Furman library's Official Government Documents reference section.
Obviously, Rosecrans' report is extremely valuable to my project. He describes, in great detail, what happened leading up September 19-20, 1863 and the events of the battle itself. Rosecrans has been criticized for failing to recognize that a break in the Union lines did not actually exist, diverting troops to hold the nonexistent gap, allowing Confederate Gen. Longstreet to break through the Union lines, and for sending Garfield to meet Thomas instead of going himself. He seemed to believe, in writing his report, that he did not make any mistakes. He doesn't mention that Longstreet broke through the Union lines or that the "gap" didn't really exist.
Obviously, Rosecrans' report is extremely valuable to my project. He describes, in great detail, what happened leading up September 19-20, 1863 and the events of the battle itself. Rosecrans has been criticized for failing to recognize that a break in the Union lines did not actually exist, diverting troops to hold the nonexistent gap, allowing Confederate Gen. Longstreet to break through the Union lines, and for sending Garfield to meet Thomas instead of going himself. He seemed to believe, in writing his report, that he did not make any mistakes. He doesn't mention that Longstreet broke through the Union lines or that the "gap" didn't really exist.
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